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WAGE GARNISHMENT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED
William T. Kerr*
I. Introduction
Historically, the statutory treatment of wage garnishment1 among the
states has been characterized primarily by its diversity. Although most
states exempt a specified amount of a man's wage from the reach of his
creditors, the dollar levels of these exemptions are as various as the
methods chosen to compute the amount to be exempted. 2 In addition,
legislators, some union spokesmen and some legal commentators have
become increasingly aware of the role of wage garnishment in the "debt-
or-spiral" of easy credit, discharge from employment, backruptcy3 and
welfare. Inevitably this spiral involves a disproportionate impact on the
poor.4 Impelled by these concerned groups, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 5 effective July 1, 1970.
*Member of the Michigan Bar.
1 Garnishment of wages is a statutory procedure which has roots going back as far as
medieval times. See Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law,
42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957); and RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§35, 36 (1942). A
"special note" to section 36 states:
A proceeding by which the plaintiff is enabled to reach
and to apply to the satisfaction of his claim a debt owing
to the principal defendant is ordinaily called garnish-
ment, and the principal defendant's debtor is called the
garnishee. The word 'garnish' means 'warn'; the gar-
nishee is warned that he is not to pay his debt to the
defendant, his creditor, but to the plaintiff. In some of the
New England states, the proceeding is called 'trustee
process' and the defendant's debtor is called the trustee.
2 A current list of the amounts of earnings exempted from garnishment under state laws
was published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards, May
1967.
3 See E. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC & PERSONAL FACTORS LEADING TO
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 18 (Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Michigan
State University Graduate School of Business Administration, Occasional Paper No.
15, 1965); STABLER, THE EXPERIENCE OF BANKRUPTCY 7 (1966).
4 See Hearings on H. R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 661-67 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings]. Statement of Dr. David Coplovitz, New York City, N.Y.,
Author of THE POOR PAY MORE; Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class
Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381 (1965).
5 Pub. L. 90-321, §301 (May 29, 1968).
§30 1. Findings and purpose
(a) The Congress finds:
(I)The unrestricted garnishment of compensation
due for personal services encourages the mak-
ing of predatory extension of credit. Such exten-
sions of credit divert money into excessive
371
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Yet this law is only one step in ameliorating the impact of wage garnish.
ment and, if it diverts our attention from an eventual prohibition of thi,
device, it is an unfortunate compromise. 6 Bill H.R. 11601, 7 introduced
in the House, would have placed an unqualified prohibition upon wage
garnishment.8 The final Act merely raises the level of wage exemption to
credit payments and thereby hinder the produc-
tion and flow of goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors'
remedy frequently results in loss of employment
by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of
employment, production, and consumption con-
stitutes a substantial burden on interstate com-
merce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the sev-
eral States relating to garnishment have, in
effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bank-
ruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof
in many areas of the country.
(b) On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a)
of this section, the Congress determines that the provi-
sions of this title are necessary and proper for the pur-
pose of carrying into execution the powers of the Con-
gress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws.
6 Representatives of the United States Treasury were unable to decide whether the
abolition of wage garnishment would be desirable. The Internal Revenue Service is
one of the most frequent users of wage garnishment. Hearings 103-04.
President Johnson in his March 15, 1967, Message on Urban and Rural Poverty
directed the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the
Director of the'Office of Economic Opportunity, to make a comprehensive study of
the problems of wage garnishment. This contributed as much as anything to the
evolution of a compromise on the wage garnishment issue. As a result of this
proposal, many, including Sargent Shriver, at that time Director of OEO, argued that
legislation dealing with wage garnishment should not be enacted until these studies
were completed. See the statement of Mr. DeShazor, appearing on behalf of the
American Retail Federation, Hearings 23 1, and the statement of Mr. Walker, Execu-
tive Vice President, American Bankers Association, Hearings 35 1-52. Referee Clive
Bare, who testified with three other experienced bankruptcy referees, see note 24
infra, responded accordingly:
We have been studying this problem for-at least I
have for some 10 years, and Referee Snedecor for 30
years, Referee Whitehurst for 10 years and Referee Mo-
riarty for 6 to 8 years. Certainly I do not believe that any
bill should be enacted without adequate study but we
have studied this problem for many, many years.
Each of the aforementioned referees advocated a prohibition on wage garnishment.
7 H. R. 11601, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
8 Id. §201:
The Congress finds that garnishment of wages is
frequently an essential element in predatory extensions
of credit and that the resulting disruption of employment,
production, and consumption constitutes a substantial
burden upon interstate commerce.
Sec. 202(a): No person may attach or garnish wages or
salary due an employee, or pursue in any court any
similar legal or equitable remedy which has the effect of
[Vol. 2:2
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uniform minimum9 and restricts to a certain extent the right of an
mployer to discharge an employee whose wages have been garnished. 10
"his is not enough; wage garnishment should be prohibited. In the
egislature of at least one state, Michigan, the lawmakers are presently
stopping or diverting the payment of wages or salary due
an employee.
(b): Whoever violates subsection (a) of this section
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
Pub. L. 90-321, §302-03 (May 29, 1968).
§302. Definitions
For the purposes of this title:
(a) The term 'earnings' means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated as
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and in-
cludes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment program.
(b) The-term 'disposable earnings' means that part of
the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduc-
tion from those earnings of any amounts required by law
to be withheld.
(c) The term 'garnishment' means any legal or equi-
table procedure through which the earnings of any indi-
vidual are required to be withheld for payment of any
debt.
§303. Restriction on garnishment
(a) Except as provided-in subsection (b) and in section
305, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earn-
ings of an individual for any workweek which is sub-
jected to garnishment may not exceed
(1) 25 percentum of his disposable earnings for that
week or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for
that week exceed thirty times the Federal min-
imum hourly wage prescribed by section 6(a)(l)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in
effect at the time the earnings are payable,
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay
period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by
regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum
hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in para-
graph (2).
(b) The restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in
the case of
(1) any order of any court for the support of any
person.
(2) any order of any court of bankruptcy under
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.
(3) any debt due for any State or Federal tax.
(c) No court of the United States or any State may
make, execute, or enforce any order or process in viola-
tion of this section.
10 Id. §§304-07.
§304. Restriction on discharge from employment by rea-
son of garnishment
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faced with such a proposal and have an opportunity to reconsider th(
federal compromise.11
II. Impact of Wage Garnishment
A. Impact on the Employee
Of the effects felt by the employee, the most immediate is, of course,
disciplinary action. It is common knowledge that wage garnishment is
(a) No employer may discharge any employee by rea-
son of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to
garnishment for any one indebtedness.
(b) Whoever wilfully violates subsection (2) of this
section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or impris-
oned not more than one year, or both.
Significant procedural sections include the following:
§305. Exemption for State-regulated garnishments
The Secretary of Labor may by regulation exempt
from the provisions of section 303(a) garnishments is-
sued under the laws of any State, if he determines that
the laws of that State provide restrictions on garnishment
which are substantially similar to those provided in sec-
tion 303(a).
§306. Enforcement by Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, shall enforce
the provisions of this title.
§307. Effect on State laws
This title does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any
persons from complying with, the laws of any.State
(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more
limited garnishments than are allowed under
this title, or
(2)prohibiting the discharge of any employee by
reason of the fact that his earnings have been
subjected to garnishment for more than one in-
debtedness."
11 Two separate bills were introduced in the Michigan legislature in February 1969. At the
time of this publication, no numbers had yet been assigned. Both bills were sponsored
by the Detroit Neighborhood Legal Services with the support of the U.A.W.-C.I.O.
The first, taken from the Texas constitutional prohibition on garnishment (see note 75
infra), provides:
Exemption of wages from garnishment.
No current wages for personal service shall be sub-
ject to garnishment; and where it appears upon the
trial that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant
for such current wages, the garnishee shall never-
theless be discharged as to such indebtedness.
The second, modeled after the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, provides:
1. The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due
for personal services encourages the making of predatory
extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert
money into excessive credit payments and thereby hin-
der the production and flow of goods in intra-state com-
merce.
April 1969] Wage Garnishment
considered by many employers an adequate ground for such action and
even for discharge. There are no available statistics on the frequency
with which employees are discharged by employers for this reason.
12
Some indication of the impact on employees, however, is reflected in the
policies adopted by employers when wages are garnished.
In 1966 this writer surveyed one hundred large companies located in
states where wage garnishment is permitted. Forty companies responded
to the lengthy and detailed questionnaire in this sampling, which is
2. The application of garnishment as a creditors' reme-
dy frequently results in loss of employment by the debt-
or, and the resulting disruption of employment, produc-
tion, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden
on intra-state commerce.
For the purposes of this Act:
I. The term 'earnings' means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated as
wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise, and in-
cludes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment program.
2. The term 'disposable earnings' means that part of
the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduc-
tion from those earnings of any amount required by law
to be withheld.
3. The term 'garnishment' means any legal or equitable
procedure through which the earnings of any individual
are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.
The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earn-
ings of an individual for any workweek which is sub-
jected to garnishment may not exceed:
1. 10 per centum of his disposable earnings for that
week; or
2. the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceed forty times the Federal minimum hourly
wage prescribed by Section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 in effect at the time the earnings
are payable, whichever is less. In the case of earnings for
any pay period other than a week, the exemption shall be
forty, a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage
equivalent in effect to that set forth in this Act.
The restrictions of this Act do not apply in the case of:
i. any order of any Court for the support of any
person;
2. any order of any Court of Bankruptcy under Chap-
ter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act;
3. any debt due for any State or Federal Tax.
No Court of this State may make, execute, or enforce
any order or process in violation of this Act.
No employer may discharge any employee by reason
of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to
garnishment for any one indebtedness.
Whoever willfully violates this Act shall be fined not
more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
12W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, estimated the number of wage garnish-
ment-precipitated discharges to be between 100,000 and 300,000 annually. Hearings
739.
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hereafter referred to as the Survey.' 3 Twenty-seven of the responding
companies indicated that they have a practice of discharging employees
whose wages are garnished an excessive number of times. Fourteen of
these indicated that the practice had been reduced to a fixed corporate
policy, while the rest treated each case individually. One New York
department store discharges an employee after a single garnishment is
received. Five companies discharge after the second, six after the third
and two after the fourth garnishment within a calendar year. One of the
thirteen companies indicating that they do not discharge an employee
because of wage garnishments commented:
We do not discharge for garnishment even
though we would like to release the bad
offenders (10 to 15 a year). These people in a
lot of cases don't seem to try to do better
even with counseling, help, advice and
threats. These people use very poor judg-
ment. Make the same mistakes over and
over.
A study conducted in 1958 among 133 companies in and near New
Haven, Connecticut, indicated that only nineteen considered garnish-
ment as sufficient grounds for dismissal.1 4 Over one-half said that each
case was given special consideration, which indicates that an in-
determinate number would dismiss an employee for excessive wage
garnishments, but have not reduced the practice to a fixed policy. Two
of the companies commented that in their organization dismissal was
appropriate if the employee's salary was garnished four times, but they
added that the policy was not strictly enforced. On the other hand, one
company remarked that, "Usually repeaters are not the type suited for
our work and leave or are dismissed for other reasons."
In state committee proceedings on attachments in 1964 remarks made
by California Assemblyman Johnson revealed a similar experience:
I know that there are companies that have
inflexible rules if they have so many attach-
ments. They are discharged regardless of
whether they are valuable employees or
not .... Now this is my own experience so I
13 Considering the lengthy nature of these questionnaires inquiring about corporate policies
toward garnishment of employee wages, a forty per cent response was probably not
unusual. It was felt that a lesser number of detailed answers would reveal more of
analytical value than a greater number of simple, general answers. The results of the
survey justified this opinion. The form of the questionnaire and the responses it
brought forth are included in Appendix A, infra at 397.
14 Garnishment of Employees' Wages; Survey by N.O.M.A.'s New Haven Chapter, 33
Office Exec. 42 (Feb. 1958).
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know what I am talking about in this respect,
and you may be right that it is only a small
percentage, but it is very important to these
people who lose their jobs because of attach-
ments.'5
He added that, "... most of the companies have a rule, sometimes only
one and a maximum of three garnishments and they lose their job."'16 A
study examining garnishment cases in the Wisconsin cities of Green
Bay, Kenosha, Racine and Madison revealed that eleven per cent of the
garnished employees were fired forthwith; forty-one per cent were warn-
ed of dismissal. In fifteen per cent of the cases the employer tried to help
the employee. 17 There was no indication in cases involving warning or
discharge whether the employee had been garnished previously. Another
survey was made in San Diego, California.' 8 Seventy-one of sev-
enty-two firms having a policy on wage garnishment gave a warning on
the first attachment. Twelve firms, or seventeen per cent, fired the
employee on the second attachment. Thirty-five more fired the employee
after the third. Cumulatively, two-thirds fired an employee with as many
as three garnishments. In addition, another ten firms fired an employee
on the fourth attachment, and another on the fifth. Of the seventy-two
companies reporting, only thirteen, or eighteen per cent, did not fire for
wage attachment. Of these, nine reported that wage attachments were
not a problem.
Business periodicals have encouraged employers to adopt a dismissal
policy as a means of warding off what was felt to be a growing problem.
What can you do? First, clamp down with a
reasonable rule as the Crane Company [Chi-
cago] did. The rule: Two of these documents
served on the company within a twelve
month period and the employee can be
fired.' 9
Recent studies, according to the National Association of Manufacturers,
indicate that a majority of companies dismiss employees whose wages
are garnished a third time.
20
15 California Assembly Interim Comm. on the Judiciary, Proceedings on Attachments 44
(1964), [hereinafter cited as Proceedings] cited in Brunn, Wage Garnishments in
California;A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965).
16 Proceedings 59. See also Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical
Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743, 754-59 (1968).
17 Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 759, 766 n.
29.
18 Hearings 1020-21.
19 King, When a Worker Goes Too Far in the Hole, You Pay, 119 FACTORY 178 (August
1961).
20 Id. at 179.
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It is not clear whether employers always limit such a rule to produc-
tion employees. One company in the Survey, a large manufacturer in
Kansas City, Missouri, so indicated. On the other hand, a large depart-
ment store chain apparently applies its policy to supervisory personnel
as well, because garnishment is taken as an indicator that the employee
is poor management potential.
A second effect of wage garnishment is felt by the employee who
seeks other employment after being discharged from his former position
because of wage garnishment. Such a discharge diminishes his chance of
securing other employment. 21 Twenty-five of the thirty-five responding
companies in the Survey indicated that knowledge of such a fact would
have an adverse effect on an applicant's chances of securing employ-
ment. The others did not consider prior garnishment as relevant in their
hiring process. None of the thirty-five felt that previous wage garnish-
ments would operate as an absolute bar to employment. Moreover, a
company is not necessarily made aware of such prior garnishments, as
one company indicated: "This item is not a question on the application;
however it normally is discussed during the interview."
The ultimate impact not only of wage garnishment and discharge, but
also of the threat of discharge is personal bankruptcy. While threatened
loss of job on grounds of garnishment is certainly not the sole cause of
bankruptcy, most commentators seem to agree that the threat often
triggers a bankruptcy which may be based essentially on other under-
lying financial difficulties.2 2 Another California Assemblyman testified at
the state's 1964 hearings on attachments:
I am connected with an office that handled a
few bankruptcies and I'd say 95% are for the
purpose of saving their jobs; and the employ-
ers I think have a rule of two or possibly
three attachments within twelve months and
then they lose their jobs.
23
A panel of experienced bankruptcy referees testified before a congres-
sional subcommittee on H.R. 11601, the original House version of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act. They agreed that the number of indi-
vidual bankruptcies in a state is significantly affected by the leniency or
21 Statement of David Coplovitz, author of THE POOR PAY MORE, Hearings 662:
Studies have shown that some of the hard-core unem-
ployed are, in fact, unemployable because they have
garnishment records.
See also statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, Hearings 735.
It has been pointed out that the re-employment problem prompts an undetermined
number of employees to quit employment voluntarily to avoid garnishment. Wage
Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, supra note 16.




harshness of its garnishment laws.2 4 The following table25
their observations:
States Having the Highest and Lowest Per







































United States as a whole: 72 Filings Per 100,000 Population
When we add the dimension of wage exemptions from garnishments, the
table reveals a remarkable correlation. Only one of the states in the top
half of the table, Illinois, has a wage exemption as high as 85 per cent.
The lowest wage exemption in the lower half is 90 per cent.26 In an
excellent article 27 George Brunn discusses two specific instances which
lend further support to the relationship between tough garnishment laws
24 Hearings 417-48. Referees Whitehurst (Dallas, Texas), Snedecor (Portland, Oregon),
Bare (Tennessee) and Moriarity (California) appeared.
25 Myers, Non-Business Bankruptcies, in PROCEEDINGS OF TENTH ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE, COUNCIL ON CONSUMER INFORMATION 2.
26 It should be noted that it is impossible to tell from these statistics to what extent
employers' discharge policies affect personal bankruptcy rates.
27 See Brunn, supra note 15, at 1237.
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and high personal bankruptcy rates. In 1961, Illinois raised its ex-
emption from a flat $45 a week to a more permissive 85 per cent of
take-home pay. 28 From 1961 to 1964 non-business bankruptcies filed in
Illinois declined nine per cent, while in the same period nationally they
rose eighteen per cent. An even more striking example occurred in
Iowa, where in 1957 the 100 per cent exemption was abolished and an
unrealistic $35 per week plus $3 per dependent was substituted. 29 From
1957 to 1963 the bankruptcy rates in Iowa quadrupled, almost double
the national rate.
3 0
While the increased exemption rates in Illinois resulted in a nine
per cent decrease in personal bankruptcies, the reduction in the absolute
number is not really very striking.3 1 There is reason to believe that
employer policies do not take into consideration the size of the ex-
emption. It is the number of times that an employee's wages are gar-
nished that is most important to the employer and not whether each
garnishment secures ten per cent or fifty per cent of the employee's
wage. Thus, one might reasonably conclude that the threat of discharge
for wage garnishment has reduced the potential mollifying effect of
increased exemptions on the rate of personal bankruptcy filings. The
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act apparently counters this ten-
dency by combining a restriction on discharge with the increased ex-
emption. However, the restrictions on the employer's right to discharge
contained in Section 304(a) of the Act3 2 are ambiguous. The protective
language could be limited to situations in which an employee's wages are
garnished for a single debt; alternatively, the language could be con-
strued to protect the employee from discharge regardless of how many
creditors subject the employee to garnishment, as long as each limits
himself to a single garnishment. The latter interpretation will give the
employee considerably more protection, since it is unlikely that the
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 62 §73 (1965).
29 IOWA CODE ANN. §627.10 (1968).
30 See Note, State Wage Exemption Laws & the New Iowa Statute-A Comparative
Analysis, 43 IOWA L. REV. 555, 560 (1958).
31 The year-by-year figures, as compiled from Tables F-3 of the Annual Reports of the
Director of Administrative Offices of the United States Courts for the years
1961-1964, are:
Year Illinois U.S. III./U.S.
1961 16,356 131,397 12.1
1962 13,705 132,118 10.4
1963 14,057 139,176 10.1
1964 14,900 155,193 9.6
32 Pub. L. 90-321, §304 (May 29, 1968). Restriction on discharge from employment by
reason of garnishment.
(a) No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the tact that his




employee having financial difficulties will be pursued only by one
creditor.33
Finally, it may be admitted that wage garnishment, together with the
threat of discharge which it induces, collects a significant amount of the
repayments due from debtors. However, the vast majority of debts are
voluntarily repaid.3 4 The extent to which these are repaid as a result of
the fear of wage garnishment cannot be measured, but it should not be
overstated. Most voluntary payments are likely induced by the desire to
maintain a strong credit rating.
B. Impact on Employers
It is not difficult to understand why employers have adopted reason-
ably strict attitudes toward employees whose wages have been gar-
nished. Garnishment of an employee's wage is costly, inconvenient
and indicative of a degree of financial irresponsibility that may both
reflect upon the reputation of the company and suggest that the employ-
ee involved will be less productive or less capable than he was before
garnishment. Estimates of cost per garnishment vary rather widely. The
Cook County Credit Bureau in Chicago surveyed 1,100 employers in
1964 and found that processing a single garnishment costs from $15 to
$35. The estimated costs of garnishment to the surveyed employers
totaled $12 million annually.3 5 A study by the Long Island Railroad
Company revealed that for every $100 of employee indebtedness man-
agement spends $20 to process the collection. 36 The Crane Company of
Chicago figures that each garnishment costs the company $50, each
wage assignment $20. 3 7 The writer's Survey indicated a greater variation
in estimated costs, ranging from $25 to "minimal" and "very little."
Twenty-one of the thirty-five responding companies could not estimate
the cost; this included eighteen of the twenty-seven who indicated that
they do discharge an employee whose wages are garnished excessively.
33Pub. L. 90-321, §§301-7 (May 29, 1968). The revised final draft of the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (November 1968), governing situations arising out of a
consumer credit sale, consumer lease or consumer loan, would prohibit garnishment
before judgment against the debtor (§5.104). The Code would limit garnishment by
the same measures as the 1968 Act, except that the maximum amount subject to
garnishment may not exceed "the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceed forty times the Federal minimum hourly wage..." [Emphasis added],
§5.105), rather than the multiple of "thirty" in the 1968 Act. Section 5.106 contains
an unqualified prohibition on discharge regardless of the number of times an employ-
ee's wages are garnished.
34 The delinquency rate on installment credit has been estimated at between one and two
per cent. Proceedings App. A (letter from Robert Kopriva, Associated Credit Bu-
reaus of California).
35 Wall St. J. Mar. 15, 1966 at 14, col. 3-4.
36 Stessin, Managing Your Manpower, 77 DuNs R. & MoD. IND. 67-68 (Jan. 1961).
37 Trueman, Head Off Employee Garnishment, 25 ADM. MGT. 10 (April 1964).
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This fluctuation in cost estimates can be attributed to the cost factors
considered relevant by each employer. The cost of a wage garnishment
varies among employers according to their labor costs, the difficulty in
computing the employee's exemptions, the necessity of court appear-
ances and resulting loss of job time by the employee, the necessity of
utilizing outside counsel, and the extent to which the employer's payroll
system has been computerized. It is impossible to determine whether
identical cost elements were used when two companies computed their
costs. Most employers have not undertaken to make precise cost esti-
mates, but no computation would accurately reflect differences among
employers unless a uniform system of accounting and identification of
cost elements were in effect.
The Survey confirms the opinion of George Brunn3 8 that cost is not
the sole reason motivating employers to discharge an employee whose
wages have been garnished. Of the twenty-seven companies in the
Survey that indicated a policy of discharging employees, only eight cited
cost as the sole factor behind their policy. Nine others combined cost
with the fact that garnishment indicated that the employee was a
non-productive individual. Three companies cited the latter as the sole
reason. Other factors cited as the sole reason for discharging the em-
ployee included the inconvenience and time-consuming nature of gar-
nishment and its reflection on the management potential of the em-
ployee.
Wage garnishment, which typically serves to inform the employer of
the financial plight of an employee, has precipitated employer action
beyond the formulation of discharge policies.3 9 It appears that very few
employers rely on discharge as their sole means of protection.
Thirty-one of the thirty-five companies responding to the Survey in-
dicated that some form of assistance is provided to employees whose
financial problems have been brought to the attention of the employer. A
typical reply was as follows:
3
8 See Brunn, supra note 15.
3 9 See Statement of I. W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers of America, Hearings
754-71, and particularly the following exchange:
Mrs. Sullivan. Do you know whether any of these
companies have debt counsellors who help employees
who get themselves into financial trouble?
Mr. Abel. There is some of that in the personnel de-
partments, but it isn't a large practice.
Again, the companies take the position that this is a
cost and something they can't afford. It is bad enough the
burden is placed upon them to make the collections and
do the paperwork and take care of the creditors. So,
there isn't too much of that. Id. at 772.
A notable exception is Inland Steel Corp. Hearings 74.
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Nothing formal, but the advice and counsel of
the supervisor or perhaps a staff person is
available. We prefer that employees make a
request for help in their personal financial
matters. In a few meritorious cases, we have
loans to help employees in need- for ex-
ample where they are saddled with the debts
of relatives.
A few companies appear to be less helpful. One large manufacturer said:
The company does not counsel employees as
such about financial difficulties. When a gar-
nishment is received, the company attitude
toward employees satisfying their individual
financial responsibilities is explained in detail.
It is also indicated at that time that repeated
occurrences may lead to disciplinary layoffs
or discharge.
One business periodical40 noted the apparent fact that employers "do
little until they receive a garnishment notice." The Survey lends support
to this observation. Twenty-five of the thirty-four responding companies
said they have no formalized policy of credit education designed to
avoid a first garnishment. Two of the nine which said they did have such
a policy indicated that they engaged in credit education either informally
and on an individual basis or "very little." A Michigan department store
chain said that "before garnishment proceedings, a company will usually
contact us in an effort to start their collection again." This provides a
signal for active efforts in aid of the employee, which were felt by that
responding company to be the reason it had never had an employee's
wages garnished. The situation recounted in one business periodical
must be considered an exception:
At Consolidated Laundries, Inc. in New
York City, there is a stringent policy which
forbids vendors from entering the plant or
operating on its property. Security guards are
alerted to shoo away sidewalk merchants,
and a campaign has been launched to warn
employees against shoddy selling practices. 41
The most effective aspect of such a policy is the credit education effort.
No estimate has ever been made of the cost of such preventive measures
to the affected employers.
40 See note 19 supra.
41 Stessin, Managing your Manpower, 77 DUNs R. & MOD. IND. 67, 68 (Jan. 1961).
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C. Impact on Society
Society underwrites a considerable portion of the cost of wage gar-
nishment. Data obtained by George Brunn from the San Francisco
Sheriff's Office revealed that fees for 1963-1964 totaled $113,554, while
estimated costs of running that office exceeded $250,000.42 It is prob-
ably fair to assume that this experience is not atypical. Fees are usually
set at a dollar amount or on a mileage basis and are often in need of
revision. Since they are inadequate to cover actual costs of operation,
the difference must be made up out of tax revenue and society in effect
provides a substantial subsidy to the creditor.
To the extent wage garnishment ends in bankruptcy, discharge from
employment, or both, society absorbs the cost of supporting individuals
on welfare as well. The Cook County Department of Public Aid noted
that nine per cent of the persons on its relief rolls had been fired from
their jobs after an encounter with wage garnishment. 43 No statistics are
yet available on the extent to which this experience has been repeated
throughout the country.
III. The Role of The Labor Unions
In light of the direct impact of wage garnishment on the employ-
er-employee relationship, it is somewhat surprising that labor unions
have not played a more active role in attempting to restrict the discretion
of employers to discharge employees for that reason.4 4 In the Survey,
only three of the twenty-three companies responding to the question
indicated that there had been any efforts by the union in this respect.
Only one was partially successful. One unaccountable reply of a national
tire manufacturer noted: "Have never had the provision in the contract
42 It should be noted that these figures refer to civil litigation in general and are not
restricted to garnishment situations. See Brunn, supra note 15; Comment, Wage
Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REv. 743, n. 6
(1968).
43 Wall St. J. Mar. 15, 1966 at 14, col. 3-4. The syndrome of wage garnishment, discharge,
bankruptcy and relief is believed by some to have played in the past and to be still
playing today a significant role in generating the resentment which underlies the
disturbances which have prevailed in major cities throughout the country. E.g., Letter
of Mr. John Houston, Neighborhood Legal Services Center, Detroit, Michigan,
Hearings 888-89; article by Mr. Milton J. Huber, Associate Professor, Center for
Consumer Affairs, University Extension, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Hearings 1026-31;
Statement of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Hearings 1175-80.
44 Congressman Frank Annunzio, one of the leading proponents of abolishing wage gar-
nishment, commented: "I am disappointed that the national AFL-CIO could not take
a position at this time on this legislation." Hearings 197. He later said they might
"need a little prodding". Id. at 540. But see note II supra regarding the role of the
UAW-CIO in Michigan in 1969.
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and cannot get an agreement from the union to put one in." The os-
tensible justification for union diffidence on this subject lies in the prece-
dents set by certain arbitration awards rendered in the late 1950's.
Discharges of employees whose wages had been garnished an excessive
number of times were upheld on the ground that a company rule setting
a limit of two or three garnishments was reasonable. 45 The only in-
stances in which an arbitrator reinstated a discharged employee involved
situations where the company rule had not been adequately publicized
46
or had been arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced. 4 7 These cases,
however, involved submission of an "all disputes" clause for inter-
pretation by the arbitrator. Thus, these decisions would not preclude the
inclusion of a provision specifically dealing with wage garnishment in the
collective bargaining agreement. In fairness to the unions it should be
acknowledged that unless the subject matter is a "mandatory" subject of
collective bargaining within the terms of the National Labor Relations
Act 48 the union has no right to enforce its demand by means of a strike.
If a subject falls outside the mandatory area, the union can seek to
bargain with the employer about the particular subject, but may not
carry 'its demands to the point of impasse. The subjects as to which
employers have an obligation to bargain are vaguely defined in section
8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act as "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 49 Whether discharge for wage
garnishment comes within these terms has never been litigated. The
question involves both an element which is unrelated (the garnishment)
and an element which is related to the job (the discharge). The mixed
nature of the subject matter has contributed to uncertainty and a result-
ing loss of bargaining power by the unions. Other subjects also involving
4 Ideal Cement Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 690 (1958); International Harvester Co., 21 Lab. Arb.
709 (1953). In Kroger Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 421 (1957), the union and the employer
agreed to a rule permitting the discharge of an employee after two garnishments.
After discharge and at the arbitration hearing, the employee argued that the service of
the garnishment notice was erroneous because the federal bankruptcy court, approv-
ing a plan to satisfy all creditors, had exercised its power of preemption. The
arbitrator ruled that although the state court may have erred by issuing the garnish-
ment order, the notice served on the employer was voidable rather than void and the
employee had not attempted to set aside the order.
In Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 28 Lab. Arb. 411 (1957), an employee was
discharged pursuant to a plant rule after his employer was served with three garnish-
ments. Two of the garnishment notices were pursuant to the same judgment and the
employee argued that this was the equivalent of one violation. The arbitrator ruled
against the employee, noting that each garnishment was individually served. See
Kovarsky, Discharges for Events Occurring Away From Work, 13 LAB. L. J. 344
(1962); Fisher, How Garnisheed Workers Fare Under Arbitration, 90 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. I (1967).
4 American Bakeries Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 1058 (1958).
4 7 Trailmobiles, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 160 (1956).
48 29 U.S.C. §§141-197 (1964).
4 Id. at § 158(d).
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mixed elements have been declared mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, however: for example, the preservation of an employee's
rights after induction into the armed services. 50 Still, unions have elected
not to press the issue of wage garnishments to the point of impasse. This
decision is probably attributable to the strength of employer reluctance
to bargain on the issue,5 1 but it is nevertheless unfortunate. If union
resources were applied in negotiating contracts, litigating cases or even
lobbying for legislation resulting in the abolition of discharge on grounds
of wage garnishment, the impact would be very definitely felt in the law
of garnishment.
IV. Legislative Reaction- A Criticism
Recognizing these varying aspects of the impact of wage garnishment,
legislators introduced in the New York Legislative Assembly in 196552
several bills aimed at eliminating the most tangible and direct effect of
wage garnishment, discharge from employment. This legislative effort
resulted in the enactment of section 5252 of the Civil Practice Act. It
provides:
(1) No employer shall discharge or lay off an
employee because an income execution has
been served upon such employer against the
employees' wages; provided, however, that
this provision shall not apply if more than one
income execution against such employee is
served upon the employer within any period
of twelve consecutive months after January
first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven.
53
With some modification, this was the "model" for the provision re-
stricting discharge in the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.
54
This solution to the wage garnishment syndrome is simplistic and inequi-
table; more importantly, it is incapable of achieving the desired degree of
protection for the debtor-employee.
5 0 N LRB v. Knoxville Pub. Co., 124 F.2d 875 (6th Cir. 1942). See generally McManemin,
Subject Matter of Collective Bargaining, 13 LAB. L.J. 985 (1962); Annot., 12 ALR
2d 265 (1950).
51 See Brunn, supra note 15, at 1234 n. 113.
52 Bills introduced into New York were the following: Senate Intro. 2168 (1965); Senate
Intro. 2299 (1965); Senate Intro. 3061, Assembly Intro. 4920, vetoed July 19, 1965;
Senate Intro. 4164 (1965); Senate Intro. 4146 (1965); Assembly Intro. 3267 (1965);
Assembly Intro. 3577 (1965). Legislative activity has also taken place in New Jersey.
Wall St. J. Mar. 15, 1966 at 14 col. 3, 4.
53 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §5252 (McKinney 1966).




The immediate result of a prohibition on an employer's right to dis-
charge an employee for wage garnishment is to force the employer to act
as a collection agency for creditors. These same creditors have some-
times contributed to the financial plight of the debtor through unrealis-
tically relaxed credit standards combined with other active inducements
to buy. The employer and society continue to bear much of the total cost
of garnishment, while it is the creditor in a private transaction who
benefits from the device. Where the right to discharge is the only aspect
of the garnishment process which is eliminated, employers will be forced
to underwrite the system to an even greater extent, because garnishment
will continue to operate against employees who might formerly have
been discharged. Creditors will be more eager to use the device when
they can be assured that in so doing they cannot cut off the source of
their security. An employer's reaction to this situation was reflected in
the following statement by the president of a Pennsylvania corporation:
Is there any excuse for a merchant to take on
a poor credit risk? Shouldn't the merchant,
whose whole sales strategy seems to be to
stress the ease with which payments can be
met, have to take some of the risk for
over-selling? Why should a company manage-
ment have to bail out the loan shark who
plays upon the gullible?
55
It has been argued that a ban on the right to discharge, such as in New
York, will force employers to take a more active part in the credit
education of their employees. One employer responding to the Survey
did indicate that if such a law were enacted it would "be necessary... to
install a program of providing information and credit education to em-
ployees." As indicated earlier, however, many employers already take
some steps to prevent a second garnishment by providing various forms
of aid or information to the employee in trouble. It is questionable
whether an employer would see in a prohibition on his right to discharge
any necessity to expand this program and attempt to avoid the first
garnishment also. It might even prove more economical to allow the first
garnishment to serve as an indicator as to which individuals need such
credit education. If so, it is doubtful that present employer policies will
be changed to any great extent. With so doubtful an improvement, one
must certainly question whether it justifies coercing an innocent
third-party employer to bear the costs of making a creditor whole,
especially where creditors themselves go to great lengths to induce the
creation of the debtor-creditor relation.




A prohibition on discharge cannot be effectively enforced. The Survey
indicated that many employees whose wages are garnished will be dis-
charged for real or fictitious reasons relating to their conduct on the job.
Of the twenty-seven employers in the Survey who acknowledged a
policy of discharging employees for wage garnishment, twenty-one in-
dicated that they would comply with an outright ban and four said they
would evade the law by fabricating some other reason. Of the
twenty-one that indicated they would comply, however, nine added
"hedges" that indicate the possibility of significant interpretative and
enforcement difficulties. For example, a large food producer said:
Certainly if there were legal requirements the
company would comply with the law. If
... irregular attendance were also involved,
this would be given special attention. [Em-
phasis added].
Other similar responses included the following:
We would comply. If the relative cost be-
came too burdensome, we would support leg-
islation to make things more equitable.
While we would not evade the law by dis-
charging such an employee by finding or man-
ufacturing another dischargeable offense, we
would take a critical look at his conduct on
the job.
If the employee continued to get garnished,
usually his attendance would not be good, if
this was the case the employee may be dis-
charged for excessive absences.
One major manufacturer merely said that such a law "would not stand
up." The correlation between an excessive number of wage garnish-
ments and ancillary deficiencies in the employee's performance of his
job is also supported by the comments of employers in the New Haven
study mentioned earlier.56 This correlation clearly provides employers
with an alternative ground for discharge. Any statutory scheme which
forces them to use an alternative by simply prohibiting discharge for
garnishment reasons will face serious enforcement problems.
At least three general approaches to the enforcement of a prohibition
on discharge have found specific expression in proposed or enacted
56 See note 14 supra.
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legislation. A bill which passed the New York Assembly and Senate, but
was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller on July 19, 1965, would have
made discharge in violation of the prohibition an unfair labor practice.
5 7
This would have required an amendment to the local labor law and
therefore would not be available to other states having no labor board. A
second approach, which became a part of section 5252 of the New York
Civil Practices Act, would give the discharged employee a civil action
for damages for lost wages as a result of the discharge. 58 The New York
statute also authorized the court to reinstate the discharged employee.
Except for its value as a deterrent, however, such a measure has ques-
tionable utility considering the personal problems which could be
created by forced reinstatement after discharge. Finally, the approach in
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act would make violation of
the act a criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.
59
Regardless of the enforcement method adopted, a violation of the
prohibition would occur if and when an employee was discharged "be-
cause of" a wage garnishment. In light of the statements of employers in
the Survey indicating scrutiny of alternative grounds for discharge, we
have already seen the significant interpretive difficulties and consequent
enforcement problems that are likely to result. It cannot, however, be
contended that the courts and arbitrators are not competent to deal with
this difficult factual issue. An appropriate analogy has been drawn to the
demonstrated ability of the National Labor Relations Board to litigate
the question of whether an employee has been disciplined because of his
union activity or his job performance. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that an
employee who has been dismissed because of wage garnishment will be
able to afford the legal services necessary to bring a complex factual
issue to trial or to sustain protracted litigation.
In considering enforcement by criminal sanctions we must face the
serious question of whether such sanctions will be utilized. It is arguable
that politically motivated district attorneys, who have enough to do
without prosecuting what is essentially a labor dispute, will not be
willing to pursue a complaint against a well-regarded local company.
This is, of course, less true of the federal enforcement machinery under
the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
57 Senate Intro. 3061, Assembly Intro 4920, vetoed July 19, 1965. No veto message was
given.
58 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §5252 (2) (McKinney 1966) provides:
An employee may institute a civil action for damages
for wages lost as a result of a violation of this section
within ninety days after such violation. Damages recov-
erable shall not exceed lost wages for six weeks and in
such action the court also may order the reinstatement of
such discharged employee. Not more than ten per cen-
turn of the damages recovered in such action shall be
subject to any claims, attachments or executions by any
creditors, judgment creditors or assignees of such em-
ployee.




Some form of cost-shifting device would make a ban on discharge
more equitable for the employer. A study conducted by Michigan State
University in 195960 recommended, in part, that the costs of garnish-
ment be shifted to the creditor. Such an approach might increase the
percentage of employers who would voluntarily comply with the legisla-
tion and thus reduce enforcement problems. However, it would not
diminish the interpretive difficulties arising where employers choose
alternative grounds for discharge.6 1 Of the twenty-seven responding
companies that acknowledged adherence to a policy of discharging em-
ployees for wage garnishment, eighteen said that a cost shift would have
no effect upon that policy, and only three replied that it would change
policy.
A cost-shifting device would be extremely difficult to implement. As
mentioned earlier, employers' costs vary widely and often they are not
computed at all. Such a law would have to establish a uniform system of
accounting, since the cost of garnishment for different employers varies
with the cost elements included in the calculation by each. The ultimate
effect of this device would probably be an increase in the cost of credit
to debtors generally, as the cost shifted to the creditor would be passed
on to the consumer.
The criticisms of these attempts to alleviate the impact of wage gar-
nishment would carry substantially less weight if the attempts embodied
the only solution. However, there is an alternative method: equally
direct, easier to enforce and more likely to eradicate the ills of wage
garnishment without burdening innocent third parties. We should
prohibit wage garnishment through federal legislation; and short of this
goal, individual states should abolish the device.
V. Prohibition of Wage Garnishment?
Anyone who advocates a prohibition on wage garnishment grows
accustomed to the incredulous stares of credit-oriented interests who
regard garnishment as the bulwark of consumer debt collection. When
one examines a proposal to eliminate wage garnishment superficially, it
appears potentially harmful. However, a closer examination of its prac-
tical ramifications leads to an opposite conclusion. 62
60 Stessin, supra note 55, at 68.
61 See text accompanying note 38, supra.
62 Our attitude toward the necessity of wage garnishment is not universal. Since 1870,
when the Wages Attachment Act was enacted, England has immunized the wages of
"any servant, labourer, or workman" from attachment by creditors before or after
judgment. This Act by its terms applies only to lower classes of wage earners. The
concept of the "security of the wage packet", however, has not been exported to the




A. Effect on Employees, Employers, and Society
A prohibition on wage garnishment would immediately benefit the
debtor-employee and his family. By assuring the availability of a
wage-earner's weekly wage for living expenses, it would permit him to
break the frequently-observed cycle of garnishment, discharge, bank-
ruptcy and welfare. It would also eliminate the cost and inconvenience
which are ancillary to wage garnishment and are, in effect, subsidies now
given to the creditor by society as others, chiefly employers and sheriffs
department civil divisions, bear so much of the cost burden.
Creditor groups argue that the elimination of wages as a source for the
collection of debts will drive up credit standards and decrease the
availability of credit.6 3 This, it is said, will be harmful to debtors because
it will be impossible for them to raise their living standards by using
future wages as collateral. In addition, it will be disastrous to our totally
credit-oriented economy.64 There are no statistics which substantiate
Ratio of Installment Credit to Retail Sales65
Ratio of Installment
Installment Credit Retail Sales Credit to Personal
State Extended in 1963 in 1963 Income
(in billions of dollars)
Alabama 0.794 3.253 24.4
California 6.621 26.889 24.6
Colorado 0.665 2.649 25.1
Florida 1.905 7.610 25.0
New York 6.124 23.977 25.5
N. Carolina 1.212 4.975 24.4
Texas 3.222 12.715 25.3
63 See Hearings 1207, and the statement of Fred Noz, Association of Commercial and
Professional Attorneys, Id. at 1209,
Without the device of wage garnishment, the various
businesses mentioned in this paragraph would have no
means of enforcing collection of their accounts receiv-
able and would no longer possess any basis for extending
credit to anyone.
I4d. at 1208:
Any change in wage garnishments, which are a part of
this, (our credit-oriented economy) will do harm to our
economy as it is today. If wage garnishments are abol-
ished altogether-80 percent of all debts are collectable
through garnishments. If they are not collectable, this
will deal a severe blow to our economy.
6 Data compiled by Brunn, supra note 15, at 1241 n. 146-150.
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these dire predictions. On the contrary, the following data compiled by
George Brunn tend to disprove the extravagant claims made by credi-
tors.
Ratio of Installment Credit to Total Personal Income6
Ratio of Installment
Total Personal Credit to Personal
State Income Income





New York 53.120 11.5
N. Carolina 8.630 14.0
Texas 21.118 15.3
Florida, North Carolina and Texas have 100 per cent exemptions, while
Alabama, California and Colorado have exemptions below 85 per cent.
6 7
Thus, it appears that neither the ratio of credit sales to retail sales nor
the ratio of credit sales to total disposable personal income vary sig-
nificantly between those states with a high exemption and those with a
lower exemption level. In addition, the claim that the abolition or restric-
tion of wage garnishment would adversely affect the economic condition
of the community cannot be sustained by any available evidence. 68 One
claim of the credit groups, however, can be supported by statistical
data. The ratio of debt collections to credit extensions would decrease if
wage garnishment were not allowed. 69 However, the significant point is
that this decreased ratio had no apparent effect upon the volume of
credit extended in those states already having a 100 per cent exemption.
A partial explanation for this surprising lack of effect is that the "club"
6 Id.
67 See Table in text at 379, supra.
68 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, 1963 RETAIL TRADE 13 (1965). For
example, all the southeastern states have per capita incomes below the national
average regardless of th6 nature of their garnishment laws. Among them Florida,
which does not allow wage garnishment, had the highest per capita income, while
Mississippi, which not only allowed garnishment but had a low exemption, had the
lowest. FLA. STAT. ANN. §222.11 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. §307 (1965); Mississippi
has since raised its exemption to seventy-five per cent, Miss CODE ANN, §307
(1966). Obviously, per capita income is affected by many factors. While the foregoing
does not prove conclusively that the abolition of wage garnishment has no impact
upon the level of economic activity, it certainly supplies no evidence for the contrary
proposition.
6 9 See Brunn, supra note 15, at 1242 n. 153.
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of wage garnishment is not the only payment-inducing device available
to creditors. Nearly all people pay their debts voluntarily. Many do so to
maintain their credit standing.7 0 They would continue to do so if wage
garnishment were eliminated. Yet if it were eliminated, it is reasonable
to anticipate that creditors will be forced to raise their credit standards
by insisting on a demonstrated history of debt-responsibility. This will
mean that the consumer will have to maintain a strong credit standing by
voluntary debt repayment and demonstrated responsibility. The Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act is perhaps the first concrete indication
that society is now demanding that the creditor participate responsibly in
the education of the consumer. This consumer education will force those
people presently unwilling or unable to comprehend the extent to which
they are committing themselves beyond their ability to repay to evaluate
more critically their standing before assuming debt responsibility. At
present, credit is freely made available even to those with a history of
financial difficulties, and the desires of every consumer are heightened
by sophisticated appeals made through mass media to his acquisitive
appetite: buy an article of merchandise on credit, use it, have it repos-
sessed and buy another from the merchant down the street.7 1 Our
economy's well-developed techniques of merchandising, advertising and
promotion will undoubtedly maintain or intensify existing acquisitive
desires of consumers at all economic levels. The future, then, must see
the responsible creditor participate in re-educating the consumer toward
a realization that debt repayment is an essential prerequisite to future
credit extension. Even the poor consumer is more likely to increase
voluntary repayment of debts if his capability and opportunity for criti-
cally evaluating his commitments is increased. The result of this
re-education would modify considerably the need for credit-tightening
that has been predicted by those opposed to the abolition of wage
garnishment. It would not be surprising if the elimination of wage gar-
nishment would compel creditors to exchange and pool information on
debtor responsibility to a greater extent than in the past. While poten-
tially costly, this and any increased costs attributable to bad debt losses
would probably be passed on to debtors as higher credit cost rather than
decreased availability of credit. Such a spreading of costs among debtors
and creditors is far more equitable, however, than burdening middlemen
70 See Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L.
REV. 743, 750 (1968).
71 The appeal to acquisitive appetites is made to all consumers, regardless of their econom-
ic level. To those without economic means to satisfy their desires this creates a
frustration often satisfied by credit purchases. This predictable reaction was undoubt-
edly in the collective mind of Congress when it labelled one of the effects of the
availability of wage garnishment as "predatory" extension of credit. See §301 supra
note 5; See also Hearings 264.
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employers or society generally with the task of remedying the break-
down in the private debtor-creditor relationship.
72
B. Potential Problems in Eliminating
Wage Garnishment
Prohibitions of wage garnishment by individual states are subject to
potential frustration. Conflict of law rules permit a creditor's extra-
territorial assignment of his claim against a debtor to defeat the policies
of the state in which the claim originated. 73 This is not an insur-
mountable difficulty, however. Pennsylvania, which already has a 100
per cent exemption, and Ohio have statutes making it a criminal offense
for a resident creditor to assign a claim to a nonresident for the purpose
of evading the exemption laws of the state in which the debt originated.
Such a provision is necessary to make effective a prohibition on wage
garnishment enacted by an individual state.
The Survey revealed another potential weakness of a prohibition on
wage garnishment. Of the twenty-seven companies that acknowledged a
policy of discharging employees whose wages were garnished, twelve
indicated that they would not change their policies if wage garnishment
were prohibited. It is difficult to evaluate this reaction since the phrasing
of the question was awkward. 74 Some representative responses included
the following:
72 Admittedly, the justification for the abolition of wage garnishment discussed in this
section is not applicable to all classes of creditors. "Predatory" extensions of credit
are not characteristic of the positions of judgment creditors in personal injury or
property damage suits in which a judgment debtor was at fault. Nor is there a
"predatory" extension of credit in the case of the usual creditor who has rendered
personal services to the debtor, such as a doctor or a dentist. To permit certain
creditors to garnish wages while excluding others from using the device is a difficult
task, however. If the creditor who has rendered personal services is to be permitted
use of wage garnishment, what of the creditor who both renders a service and sells a
product, such as a home improvement company whose high pressure sales techniques
precipitate extensions of credit without regard to the debtor's ability to repay? Aside
from definitional problems, constitutional questions under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment may arise unless the categorization of classes of
creditors has a sound practical basis. Such permissive categories may, however, make
a ban on wage garnishment more palatable to some and therefore more feasible
politically. Any such permissive category should, however, still be subject to provi-
sions for prohibiting discharge as a result of any garnishment. While the text of this
article discourages reliance upon a ban on discharge to solve the problems of wage
garnishment, it may be the next best protection for the debtor in a compromise
solution such as that mentioned above.
73 See La Grone, Recovery of a Florida Judgment by Garnishing the Wages of the Head
of a Family, 17 FLA. L. REV. 196 (1964).
.74 See Appendix A, question number 8.
Wage Garnishment
The Company policy would, no doubt, be the
same since we expect all employees to satisfy
their obligations.
The Company's attitude toward financial ir-
responsibility would be unchanged.
An irresponsible attitude toward financial ob-
ligations will in most cases be combined with
a poor attitude toward the job and low pro-
ductivity. If an individual does not measure
up to Company standards, his employment
may be terminated.
In essence, these responses indicate that many employers feel that they
have a legitimate interest in the financial responsibility or irresponsibil-
ity of their employees. Would the elimination of wage garnishment
protect the employee against discharge in the event he gets into financial
difficulty? The attitudes of employers toward the financial responsibility
of their employees is shaped by a recognition that the individual cannot
prevent his relationships at home from influencing his performance on
the job. The elimination of wage garnishment and threats incident to it
should minimize the psychological problems of employees having finan-
cial difficulties since their livelihood would be secure. This, in turn,
should reduce the attendance and productivity problems which are the
specific symptoms on the job. As long as there are employers with
archaic notions about debt who discharge employees simply because of
financial irresponsibility unrelated to job performance, there remains the
possibility that creditors will retain a coercive and destructive
debt-collecting device. The creditor can merely threaten to communicate
the fact of the employee's financial plight to the employer in such a
manner that the employer would discharge the employee.
The presence of this potential problem has led to some imaginative
counter-measures in Texas, where the prohibition against wage garnish-
ment has been elevated to the constitutional level. 75 To protect the
integrity of this constitutional prohibition, Texas courts have found it
necessary to police employer-creditor contracts by expanding traditional
concepts of tort liability.7 6 Anticipating this potential circumvention of
state policy against wage garnishment, an alternative to such civil litiga-
tion as a means of control would be a measure similar to the following,
enacted to supplement a 100 per cent wage exemption:
It shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars or
75 TEX. CONST. Art. 16 §28.




by imprisonment for not more than six
months or both, for a creditor to enlist the aid
of a debtor's employer in the collection of a
debt owed to the creditor by the debtor.
Vl. Conclusion
Wage garnishment has extracted a heavy toll from employers, employ-
ees and society. The enactment of the Federal Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, although symbolic of a growing concern for those affected by
wage garnishment, will not modify its effects significantly. Those em-
ployees residing in states now having exemption levels below those
established in the Act will derive an obvious and immediate financial
advantage when their wages are garnished. It is unlikely, however, that
the employee in financial difficulty will find much comfort in the Act's
restriction on discharge, for it is indeed modest, whether inter-
preted to protect him in the event of only one garnishment or even
in the event of single garnishments by every creditor. Most employees
discharged today could be discharged for the same or substituted rea-
sons without a violation of the Act by an employer who, perhaps with
justification, is likely to react strongly when forced to bear the costs of a
breakdown in a relationship he did not create. Where wage garnishment
has been prohibited, eliminating these destructive features, the alterna-
tive which common sense indicates that creditors will substitute has
proved a lesser evil. Creditors, although collecting a lesser percentage of
their claims, continue to make credit available, but they choose to pass a
new cost, bad debt losses, on to the debtor class in the form of higher
credit costs. After weighing the equities and practicalities of this alterna-
tive cost allocation, wage garnishment clearly appears to be more trou-
blesome and inequitable than it is really worth. Wage garnishment
should be prohibited. The wage garnishment provisions of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act will then become unnecessary, representing what




The Questionnaire and Summary of Responses
1. Does your company have a policy of discharging employees whose
wages are garnished?
Responses 40 Yes 27 Discharge




Treat each case individually 13




Cost plus garnishment is indicative of a non-productive employee 9
Garnishment is indicative of a non-productive employee 3
Other 7
3. What is your estimate of the cost of each garnishment?
21 of the 35 responding companies did not know the cost
18 of the 27 responding companies who discharged employees did not
know the cost.
4. Does the company take into consideration whether an applicant for
employment has had his wages garnished in the past?
Yes 25
No 10
If yes, does this bar 0 or make less likely 25 the applicant's
chances of securing employment?
10 companies did not consider this fact in their hiring process.
5. Has the union attempted through collective bargaining to restrict
the company's right to discharge an employee for wage garnishment?





6. Do you provide counseling or other forms of aid to an employee
who has financial difficulty?
Responses 35 Yes 31
No 4
7. Does the company attempt to prevent wage garnishment by provid-
ing information or credit education to the employees?
Responses 34 Yes 9
No 25
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8. If wage garnishment were prohibited, would this in your opinion
change the company's policy?
Responses of the companies who do discharge:
Yes 8
No 12
9. If wage garnishment were allowed, but the cost burden was shifted
to the garnishing creditor, would this change the company policy?
Responses of the companies who do discharge:
Yes 3
No 18
10. If the company were prohibited from discharging an employee
whose wages were garnished, and the company continued to bear the
cost burden, would the company, in your opinion, comply 21 -; evade
the restriction by finding some other reason to discharge an employee
whose wages were continually garnished? 4
The responses to the questionnaire, as well as a tabulation of results,
are on file at the University of Michigan Law Library.
